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Abstract

The first three months of this year have witnessed extensive enforcement activity by Italy’s Autorità Garante per la Concorrenza ed il Mercato (“AGCM”). In
the closing 90 days of the chairmanship of Professor Tesauro, former Advocate
General at the European Court of Justice, the AGCM initiated a number of investigations for infringement of EC competition rules in various key markets: natural gas, telecommunication services, pharmaceuticals and postal services. The
cases reported below are of particular interest since they are the first examples
of enforcement of EC competition rules by the AGCM in the new “modernised”
system of European enforcement.
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Italy – new article 82 cases
Antitrust enforcement: four new investigations opened by the AGCM in
the first months of 2005
By Antonio Capobianco and Stefano Fratta, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP*

The first three months of this year have witnessed extensive
enforcement activity by the Italy’s Autorità Garante per la
Concorrenza ed il Mercato (“AGCM”). In the closing 90 days
of the chairmanship of Professor Tesauro, former Advocate
General at the European Court of Justice, the AGCM initiated
a number of investigations for infringement of EC competiiton
rules in various key markets: natural gas, telecommunication
services, pharmaceuticals and postal services. The cases reported
below are of particular interest since they are the first examples
of enforcement of EC competition rules by the AGCM in the
new “modernised” system of European enforcement.
Allegedly abusive conduct in the market for
gas transport
On 27 January 2005, the AGCM initiated an investigation on
alleged abuses by ENI S.p.A. through its wholly owned
subsidiary, Trans-Tunisian Pipeline Company Ltd (“TTPC”),
on the Italian market for the sale of natural gas: Case A358, in
Bollettino AGCM 4/2005. The AGCM considers that the
alleged infringements could affect a substantial part of the
common market and could therefore violate article 82 of the
EC Treaty.
The case concerns the planned expansion of a pipeline that
imports Algerian gas into Italy. TTCP has exclusive transport
rights over the pipeline, which belongs to the Tunisian government. In 2002, TTCP decided to increase the transport
capacity by adding 6.5 billion cubic meters per year. The
increased capacity should have been available in 2007.
Several gas shippers showed an interest in the initiative.
Consequently, TTCP allocated the additional capacity “pro
quota” between all four gas shippers that had received the
relevant authorisations to import.
However, the project was first delayed and then cancelled.
TTCP told the shippers that it had received a communication
from ENI alleging that the conditions on the Italian gas
market had changed, and that these changes would affect its
plans to invest in additional capacity. In particular, ENI
considered that, since the group had decided to invest in
alternative technologies, such as LNG (liquefied natural gas),
the planned increase of the Tunisian pipeline’s transmission
capacity could lead to a situation of over-supply on the Italian
gas market.
According to the AGCM, TTPC therefore refused to finalise the agreements with the four shippers on the basis of
considerations aimed solely at the protection of ENI’s
dominant position on the downstream wholesale gas market.

(ENI is considered to be dominant on the Italian wholesale gas
market: it holds a market share of 68% and controls almost the
totality of the national production.)
It is alleged that the withdrawal of the Tunisian pipeline’s
expansion plans could only be justified by ENI’s fear that an
excess of supply on the Italian market would result in increased
competition from the four gas shippers interested in the expansion of the pipeline’s capacity.
The AGCM will investigate whether the unilateral decision
to cancel the planned expansion may constitute an abuse of a
dominant position in violation of article 82 EC. By refusing to
honour its original agreement on the expansion of the pipeline, ENI/TTCP may have infringed the principle of good
faith in contractual relations.
Given the special responsibility that characterises firms in a
dominant position under EC competition law, this behaviour
is deemed to infringe article 82 EC. According to the AGCM,
ENI and TTCP were under an obligation to complete the
planned expansion in accordance with the timing and the
modalities agreed with the shippers. The AGCM considers
that its conclusions on the alleged abuses do not depend on
whether the pipeline is to be considered as an essential facility.
An interesting point raised by the decision is the reasoning
on the effect on trade between member states. The AGCM
considered that ENI’s behaviour is likely to affect such trade
because any European company could decide to acquire gas in
Algeria and import it into Italy (hence, into the EU).
In addition, the AGCM quotes the Commission’s guidelines
on the effect on trade between member states – “when an
undertaking, which holds a dominant position covering the
whole of a member state, engages in exclusionary abuses, trade
between member states is normally capable of being affected.”
It concludes that, even if ENI’s behaviour concerned the
import of gas from a source located outside the EC, the abusive practices could affect the market structure of other European pipelines that import gas into Italy, and could impede the
creation of a market for intra-Community exchanges of gas.
As to assessment of the appreciability of the effects, the
AGCM again referred to the Commission’s guidelines – “in
the assessment of the appreciability it must also be taken into
account that the very presence of the dominant undertaking
covering the whole of a member state is likely to make market
penetration more difficult.” It concluded that any abuse that
may render access to a certain market more difficult has an
appreciable effect on the intra-Community trade.
The investigation will be completed by 31 December 2005.

* Antonio Capobianco is counsel and Stefano Fratta is an associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP, Brussels
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New article 82 cases in Italy
Alleged restrictions of competition in
telecommunications services
On 23 February 2005, the AGCM decided to start an investigation into the Italian mobile telecoms market: Case A357, in
Bollettino AGCM 8/2005. In particular, the AGCM intends to
scrutinise a number of individual and collective practices by the
three main Italian mobile operators – Telecom Italia Mobile
S.p.A., Vodafone Omnitel N.V. and Wind Telecomunicazioni
S.p.A. – to assess whether any of the practices could amount to
an infringement of either article 81 or article 82 EC.
First, the AGCM will investigate whether TIM, Vodafone
and Wind, which are considered to hold a collective dominant
position on the national wholesale mobile market, had refused
to negotiate access agreements to their mobile networks, with
the purpose of preventing entry by alternative operators into
the retail mobile communications services market, including
MNVO (mobile virtual network operator). In this respect, the
AGCM suggests that such conduct, performed homogeneously and simultaneously by all three mobile telephony operators against all applicant operators, could be an anticompetitive
agreement.
Second, complainants have alleged that TIM, Vodafone and
Wind charged their competitors higher prices for their
landline-mobile termination services than those charged to
their own business customers for their integrated landlinemobile service.
More specifically, TIM, Vodafone and Wind allegedly
offered favourable financial or technical conditions to their
own commercial divisions for the sale of termination services
with the aim of excluding their competitors from the market
for integrated services for business clients.
Third, the AGCM will investigate whether the three mobile
operators have engaged in commercial practices designed to
prevent telecoms operators from using business contracts in
order to resell services to their end customers, thereby preventing any kind of competition on the mobile services retail
market. Again, the AGCM believes that such conduct may be
the result of an agreement concluded between the three
companies in order to restrict competition.
Finally, it was shown in the AGCM’s preliminary investigation that TIM and Vodafone charged almost identical prices
for certain commercial offers to their business customers,
allegedly in violation of article 81 of the EC Treaty.
The investigation will be completed by 28 April 2006.
Allegedly abusive conduct against generics in
pharmaceutical markets
On 23 February 2005, the AGCM opened two separate
investigations into alleged abuses of dominant positions by
GlaxoSmithKline and Merck & Co Inc (Cases A363 and
A364 respectively, both in Bollettino AGCM 8/2005),
preventing the development of the market for certain
generic drugs. In particular, the AGCM is investigating
alleged refusals to license active principles (i.e. the primary
ingredients for the production of pharmaceutical products)
where patents had expired, or are about to expire in the near
future, and where they are indispensable inputs for producers of generics to enter specific product and geographic
markets.
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Both investigations originated in complaints from producers
of generic drugs, who complained that they were refused
licences by Glaxo and Merck on active principles. The
complainants considered that they needed the principles in
order to be able to compete with Glaxo’s and Merck’s products.
The relevant product market on which the conduct will be
assessed has been defined by reference to the fourth level of
the ATC (Anatomical Therapeutical Classification). From a
geographic perspective, the AGCM has concluded as a preliminary that these markets are national because of the different
national healthcare regulations in place and the different patent
regimes applicable, and because of the need for national
authorisation for marketing the products.
Within these national markets, the AGCM has further
distinguished between two different distribution channels –
sales through pharmacies and sales through hospital facilities –
which have clearly distinguishable conditions of competition
and are considered to be separate relevant markets.
Both Glaxo and Merck have been deemed to be dominant
on a number of national markets:
• Glaxo is considered to be dominant in the following
markets for triptans: in the Italian market for sales through
hospitals (96%), in both the pharmacy and hospital distribution channels in the UK (74% and 89% market shares
respectively), and in the German and Spanish markets for
sales through hospitals (with 57% market shares in both
cases).
• Merck is considered to be dominant in the following markets for carbapenems: in the market for sales through pharmacies in Italy (with a market share of 73%, the remaining
27% being held by Merck’s licensees), in both the
pharmacy and hospital distribution channels in the UK
(100% and 67% market shares respectively), and in the
French market for sales through hospitals (97% market
share).
According to the AGCM, the dominant positions held by
Glaxo and Merck in these markets should not be abused to
prevent or restrict competition in the markets of the two
active principles. Such markets include drugs containing the
two active principles and any other drug that is substitutable
for them, regardless of whether it is based on other active
principles.
The AGCM’s decision to investigate Glaxo’s and Merck’s
refusal to supply is based on the fact that the patents on the
two active principles have in many cases expired or are
about to expire in the medium term. A refusal to license the
only input needed by competing producers to enter the
market is only aimed at extending the exclusive use of the
active principle beyond what is legitimately allowed by the
patent.
According to the AGCM, this conduct is at the same time
exclusionary, since it prevents the development of competing
products, and exploitative, since it allows the owner of the
active principle to charge higher prices (absent competitive
pressure), and may amount to an abuse under article 82 EC.
That applies also for the refusal to license the active principle
for sale in countries where the patent has not yet expired but
will expire in the medium term, since the refusal has the effect
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of preventing a timely and effective entry in these markets
once the patent has indeed expired.
These investigations have two aspects of particular interest.
First, both investigations have a clear multinational dimension.
The AGCM has concluded as a preliminary that both Glaxo
and Merck are dominant in several member states and,
although this is not said explicitly, that the effects of the alleged
abuses will affect countries other than Italy. Such allegations
will have to be tested in the course of the investigation, which
may not be possible for the AGCM to do without requiring
the cooperation of the competition authorities of those
countries where Glaxo and Merck are allegedly dominant.
This may be one of the first cases for application of article
22(1) of Regulation 1/2003, according to which
[t]he competition authority of a member state may in its
own territory carry out any inspection or other factfinding measure under its national law on behalf and for
the account of the competition authority of another
member state in order to establish whether there has been
an infringement of article 81 or article 82 of the Treaty.
Second, in the Merck proceeding, the AGCM is for the first
time considering the possibility of issuing interim measures.
According to the AGCM, this is a new power conferred on
the AGCM (and on all other NCAs) by article 5 of Regulation
1/2003.
While this provision is directly applicable in all member
states, it may be questioned whether the AGCM can make use
of it in the absence of national rules defining, for example, the
type of interim measures that can be ordered, the substantive
and procedural circumstances for imposing such measures, the
judicial authority competent to review the AGCM’s decision
on the interim measures, and the applicable due process safeguards. This clearly appears to be a test case and is likely to be
litigated before the administrative courts.
Both investigations will be completed by 23 February 2006.
Allegedly abusive conduct in hybrid postal
services
On 23 February 2005, the AGCM opened an investigation
into the conditions under which Poste Italiane S.p.A., the
Italian postal service, offers access to the so-called “hybrid
electronic mail” to its competitors: Case A365, in Bollettino
AGCM 8/2005.
The investigation aims to assess whether the conduct under
review amounts to an infringement of article 82 EC. Similar
unilateral conduct by Poste Italiane was found to be an infringement of the Italian Competition Act in 1998 before
national implementation of the EU directive on postal services.
“Hybrid electronic mail” is a service consisting of various
operations:
• receipt of the electronic transmission of the mail message
from the sender
• formatting the electronic message for printing
• personalisation of the message (such as the addition of corporate logos, commercial information, etc)
• printing the message
• preparing the message for mailing
• stamping and dispatching it
• actual delivery of the message to the final addressee
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Hybrid mailing services are regulated by national provisions
implementing the EU directive on the liberalisation of postal
services. According to the existing legislation, Poste Italiane
enjoys a legal monopoly over the last of the phases that characterise hybrid mailing services, i.e. the actual delivery of the
message to the final addressee. Therefore, operators of hybrid
mailing services compete in all the other upstream services,
but all of them have to use Poste Italiane’s delivery service.
The charge for the delivery service is set by Poste Italiane on
the basis of the ordinary postal tariff or, if a number of cumulative conditions are met, it is charged at a substantially lower
tariff. The conditions previously set by Poste Italiane and then
“incorporated” into the national regulation are set at such a
high level that only nationwide operators, with substantial
activities at local level in each postal district, can have access to
this more favourable price regime.
The AGCM has decided essentially to investigate the
following issues.
First, whether the conditions set by Poste Italiane for obtaining the lower tariff represent the correct methodology for
measuring lower costs or increased efficiencies derived from
the delivery of the hybrid mail. Only in such a case could the
favoured pricing scheme be justifiable. The AGCM provisionally held that this is not the case, since the conditions
imposed are not directly related to the areas and services that
may generate efficiencies in hybrid mail.
Second, whether these same conditions, and the prices
charged according to whether the conditions are met or not,
are discriminatory rather than purely linear. According to the
AGCM, the price regime imposed by Poste Italiane discriminates against those operators that do not meet the
conditions regardless of the fact that their volumes of mail
generate efficiencies and costs savings that would justify price
reductions from Poste Italiane.
Third, whether the fact that Poste Italiane charges the
ordinary postal tariff to those operators who do not meet the
conditions for the lower tariff may be an exploitative abuse
because the ordinary tariff does not reflect the services offered
to operators of hybrid mailing services. According to the
AGCM, it appears that the ordinary postal tariff includes
services that Poste Italiane offers to the general public but that
hybrid mail operators in part provide themselves. The price
charged is therefore not cost-oriented.
Because the conduct has been partly favoured or legitimised
by the current Italian regulatory framework, the investigation
will also assess whether the national regulatory framework
complies with articles 10, 82 and 86 of the EC Treaty.
This would be one of the first applications of the ruling by
the European Court of Justice in the recent judgment in
Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (C-198/01), according to which
national competition authorities have an obligation to disregard national laws that create the conditions in which firms
may infringe EC competition rules.
This investigation will be completed by 31 March 2006.

EU Pharmaceutical Law Forum 2005
19-20 May – Renaissance Hotel, Brussels
+44 (0) 20 7017 5193 – matthew.longman@informa.com
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